lity and post-eternity, that is indulged to human souls, endued with reason, morality, and liberty of will (by means whereof they are capable of commendation and blame, reward and punishment), that so they may be objects for Divine justice to display itself upon after this life, in different retributions, may, notwithstanding, be denied to those lower lives and more contemptible souls of brutes, alike devoid both of morality and liberty.

xxxvn. But if any, for all this, will still obstinately contend for that ancient Pythagoric and JEmpedoclean hypothesis, that all lives and souls whatsoever are as old as [b]the first creation, and will continue to eternity, or as long as the world doth, as a thing more reasonable and probable than our continual creation of new souls, by means whereof they become juniors both to the matter of the world and of their own bodies, and whereby also (as they pretend) the Divine creative power is made too cheap and prostituted a thing, as being farnulative always to brutish, and many times to unlawful lusts and undue conjunctions ; but especially than the continual de-creation and annihilation of the souls of brutes; we shall not be very unwilling to acknowledge thus much to them, that, indeed, of the two, this opinion is more reasonable and tolerable than that other extravagancy of those, who will either make all souls to be generated, and consequently to <be corporeal, or at least the sensitive soul, both *in* men and brutes. For, besides the monstrosity of this latter opinion, in making two distinct souls and perceptive substances in every man, which is a thing sufficiently confuted by internal